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NORTH CAROLINA'S RESIDENTIAL RENTAL
AGREEMENTS ACT: NEW DEVELOPMENTS FOR
CONTRACT AND TORT LIABILITY IN
LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONS
THEODORE 0. FILLETrE, mit
In July 1977 the North Carolina General Assembly passed the Residen-
tial Rental Agreements Act,' which was codified as the new Article 5 to
Chapter 42 of the General Statutes.2 This Act creates new responsibilities
for landlords and tenants in the care and maintenance of all residential rental
property in the state. The primary change effected by the statute is the
creation of an implied warranty of habitability in all residential leaseholds.
This article attempts to analyze the implications of the Act for new contract
and tort liability in landlord-tenant relations.
Historically, North Carolina has adhered to the common law rules in
landlord-tenant relations, with a few statutory modifications found in Chap-
ter 42 of the General Statutes. 3 The historical setting of the common law was
the feudal society of England in the fifteenth century. In that society, the
tenant was generally a farmer whose main interest in the leasehold was
uninterrupted use of land for farming. It was assumed that the farmer would
build and maintain his own shelter on the land because he was a "jack of all
trades." 4 In this economic setting, the tenant did not expect the landlord to
provide or maintain shelter as part of the bargain. Thus, the law implied no
duty on the landlord to provide or maintain any structures on the land, and
the rule of caveat emptor applied to any structures that happened to be on
the rented premises. The North Carolina courts have applied these common
law concepts to both commercial and residential leases.
5
t Member, North Carolina Bar; J.D. 1973, Boston University School of Law; A.B.
1968, Duke University. The author practices with the Legal Services of Southern Piedinont. In
that capacity he was one of the drafters of the Residential Rental Agreements Act for its
sponsors in the North Carolina General Assembly. The author gratefully acknowledges the
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the North Carolina Law Review.
1. Law of June 28, 1977, ch. 770, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1006.
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-38 to -44 (Supp. 1977).
3. Most modifications in Chapter 42 set out special rules for agricultural tenancies, id. §§
42-15 to -25 (1976), and procedures for summary ejectment of tenants, id. §§ 42-26 to -36.1.
4. See discussion of historical basis for common law rules in Javins v. First Nat'l Realty
Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
5. Robinson v. Thomas, 244 N.C. 732, 94 S.E.2d 911 (1956) (lease of apartment); Mercer
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Even when a landlord made express covenants to repair, these cove-
nants were deemed independent of the tenant's covenant to pay rent, and the
aggrieved tenant was expected to perform the repairs and then sue to recover
their costs. 6 In addition, express covenants to repair ordinarily did not
render breaching landlords liable for injuries caused by their breaches.
7
In 1974 the North Carolina Supreme Court finally departed from the
anachronistic doctrine of caveat emptor and recognized an implied warranty
of habitability applicable to vendors of newly constructed housesA Having
acknowledged the modern trend away from applying the doctrine of caveat
emptor to the sale of new houses, the court might logically have recognized
implied warranties in the parallel area of leased housing. 9 In the following
year, however, the court of appeals refused to recognize the implied war-
ranty of habitability in leased housing, stating that it was still bound by the
common law precedents of the North Carolina Supreme Court.' 0 The su-
preme court denied certiorari,11 declining this invitation to extend the
implied warranty doctrine to leaseholds.
When the court of appeals refused to modernize these common law
rules in 1975, it referred to the failure of the General Assembly to make
essentially the same policy change during the 1975 Session.12 By 1977 it
was apparent that if landlord-tenant relations were to escape fifteenth cen-
tury England it would be by legislative reform only. The North Carolina
General Assembly rose to the occasion by enacting Chapter 770 of the 1977
Session, the "Residential Rental Agreements Act ' 13 (or, as it is also
v. Williams, 210 N.C. 456, 187 S.E. 556 (1936) (lease of hardware store-no implied duty to
repair); Carolina Mtg. Co. v. Massie, 209 N.C. 146, 183 S.E. 425 (1936) (lease of theater-no
implied duty to repair); Fields v. Ogburn, 178 N.C. 407, 100 S.E. 583 (1919) (lease of house-no
implied duty to repair and, therefore, no liability for injuries caused by state of disrepair);
Smithfield Improvement Co. v. Coley-Bardin, 156 N.C. 255, 72 S.E. 312 (1911) (commercial
lease-no implied duty to repair); Clarke v. Kerchner, 11 N.C. App. 454, 181 S.E.2d 787 (1971);
Thompson v. Shoemaker, 7 N.C. App. 687, 173 S.E.2d 627 (1970) (lease of house-no implied
duty to repair even though housing code violated).
6. See Leavitt v. Twin County Rental Co., 222 N.C. 81, 21 S.E.2d 890 (1942).
7. Id. For a more detailed discussion of tort liability of landlords, see text accompanying
notes 107-27 infra.
8. Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974). The implied warranty is that
"the dwelling, together with all its fixtures, is sufficiently free from major structural defects
and is constructed in a workmanlike manner, so as to meet the standard of workmanlike quality
then prevailing." Id. at 62, 209 S.E.2d at 783.
9. This implied warranty has been recognized in 38 states and the District of Columbia.
See note 16 and accompanying text infra.
10. Knuckles v. Spaugh, 26 N.C. App. 340, 215 S.E.2d 825, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 241,
217 S.E.2d 665 (1975).
11. 288 N.C. 241, 217 S.E.2d 665 (1975).
12. Knuckles v. Spaugh, 26 N.C. App. 340, 340, 215 S.E.2d 825, 826, cert. denied, 288
N.C. 241, 217 S.E.2d 665 (1975).
13. Law of June 28, 1977, ch. 770, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1006 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 42-38 to -44 (Supp. 1977)).
RESIDENTIAL RENTAL AGREEMENT ACT
known, the "Landlord-Tenant Act" 14).
I. NEW TENANT RIGHTS IN CONTRACT
The primary effect of the new Act is to create the implied warranty of
habitability in every residential leasehold in North Carolina.15 This implied
warranty has been adopted by case law or statute in thirty-eight states and
the District of Columbia. 16 Most of the statutes, including North Carolina's,
have been patterned after the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act,
which was drafted and recommended for enactment in all the states by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in August
1972.17 The North Carolina Act creates the implied warranty by defining
certain duties of the landlord to provide fit premises 18 and by making the
14. Charlotte Observer, May 17, 1977, at 18A, col. 1; Raleigh, N.C., News & Observer,
May 27, 1977, at 4, col. I.
15. The only exclusions from coverage are transient lodging in hotels, motels, or "similar
lodging subject to regulation by the Commission for Health Services" and dwellings furnished
"without charge or rent." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-39 (Supp. 1977).
16. Alaska: ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.03.100, .160, .180 (1974); Arizona: ARIz. REv. STAT. §§
33-1324, -1361 (1974); California: CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1941, 1941.1, 1942 (West 1954 & Cum.
Supp. 1978); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974);
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-7, -12, -13 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); Delaware:
DEL. CODE tit. 25, § 5303 (1974); District of Columbia: Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428
F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
83.51, .56 (Harrison 1976); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-111 to -112 (1966); Hawaii: HAW.
REV. STAT. § 521-42 (1976); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Idaho: IDAHO
CODE § 6-320 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Illinois: Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 111. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d
208 (1972); Indiana: Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976);
Iowa: Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Kansas: Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521
P.2d 304 (1974); Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. §§ 383.595, .625 (Cum. Supp. 1974); Maine: ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (West Supp. 1974); Maryland: MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-
211 (Cum. Supp. 1975), superseded in their respective jurisdictions by Baltimore, Md., City
Public Local Laws, § 9-9, -10, -14.1 (July 1, 1971); Montgomery County, Md. Code, Fair
Landlord-Tenant Relations, ch. 93A (Nov. 21, 1972); Massachusetts: MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
239, § 8A (Law. Co-op 1932 & Cum. Supp. 1977); Boston Housing Auth. v. Hemingway, 363
Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); Michigan: MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1109 (1970); Rome v.
Walker, 38 Mich. App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972); Minnesota: MINN. STAr. ANN. § 504.18
(West Supp. 1977), applied in Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54,213 N.W.2d 339 (1973); Missouri:
King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1973); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1419, -1425 to
-1429 (1976); New Hampshire: Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); New Jersey:
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130,265 A.2d 526 (1970); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-7-20, -
27 (Supp. 1975); New York: N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1977); Ohio: OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.04, .07 (Page Supp. 1977); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. §§ 91.770, .800 to
.815 (1977); Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 329
A.2d 812 (1974); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-2824 (1976); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. §§
55-248.13, .25 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060 (Supp.
1976) (enacted after judicial implication of warranty of habitability in Foisy v. Wyman, 83
Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973)); Wisconsin: Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d
409 (1961). But see Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970).
17. The National Conference is affiliated with the American Bar Association and has as its
purpose drafting and lobbying for the enactment of uniform laws in diverse legal areas. One law
promulgated by the National Conference is the Uniform Commercial Code.
18. Section 42-42(a) requires the landlord to:
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tenant's duty to pay rent mutually dependent upon adequate performance of
these duties. 19 These provisions reverse the common law rules that the
landlord had no implied duties to provide or maintain fit premises and that
express covenants to maintain the premises were independent of the tenant's
covenant to pay rent. 20
A. New Contract Remedies
The remedies allowed under the new Act are not clear and probably
will be the subject of confusion and litigation. One initial question that
needs to be resolved concerns when the tenant is entitled to reduce the
amount of his rental payment after the landlord has failed to perform his
duties under section 42-42(a).21 In jurisdictions that have adopted the im-
plied warranty of habitability by judicial amendment of the common law,
the mutuality of the tenant's obligation to pay rent and the landlord's
obligation to provide fit premises has been interpreted to allow the tenant to
withhold rent and to assert a breach of the implied warranty of habitability as
a defense to a summary ejectment action. 22 Although North Carolina's Act
makes the tenant's obligation to pay rent mutually dependent upon the
landlord's obligation to provide fit premises, its remedies section states that
the tenant "may not unilaterally withhold rent prior to a judicial determina-
tion of a right to do so." 23
(1) Comply with the current applicable building and housing codes, whether enacted
before or after October 1, 1977, to the extent required by the operation of such codes;
no new requirement is imposed by this subdivision (a)(l) if a structure is exempt from
a current building code;
(2) Make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit
and habitable condition;
(3) Keep all common areas of the premises in safe condition; and
(4) Maintain in good and safe working order and promptly repair all electrical,
plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air conditioning, and other facilities and ap-
pliances supplied or required to be supplied by him provided that notification of
needed repairs is made to the landlord in writing by the tenant except in emergency
situations.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42(a) (Supp. 1977).
19. Section 42-41 provides: "The tenant's obligation to pay rent under the rental agreement
or assignment and to comply with G.S. 42-43 and the landlord's obligation to comply with G.S.
42-42(a) shall be mutually dependent." Id. § 42-41.
20. For a detailed discussion of changes from the common law brought by the adoption of
the implied warranty of habitability, see generally Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1070 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42(a) (Supp. 1977), quoted in note 18 supra.
22. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974);
Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130,
140, 265 A.2d 526, 531 (1970).
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-44(c) (Supp. 1977) provides:
The tenant may not unilaterally withhold rent prior to a judicial determination of a
right to do so. The tenant shall be entitled to remain in possession of the premises
pending appeal by continuing to pay the contract rent as it becomes due; provided that,
in such case, the provisions of G.S. 42-34(b) shall not apply.
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Numerous difficult questions are raised by this language. There is no
definition of the phrase "judicial determination"; arguably this requirement
could be satisfied by a magistrate's judgment or a preliminary injunction in
the district or superior court. There is no definition of the phrase "unilater-
ally withhold" which is obviously the key to possible limits on the tenant's
remedies. Finally, there is no explanation of what consequences follow if
the tenant does "unilaterally withhold rent."
The phrase "unilaterally withhold rent" could be interpreted to include
any prelitigation failure to pay rent by a tenant, including refusals to pay rent
when a landlord is in breach of the implied warranty of habitability created
by sections 42-41 and 42-42.24 If such an interpretation were adopted, the
tenant would have to obtain a judicial determination of his right to withhold
rent or keep paying the contract rent to avoid a summary ejectment action.
This would not mean, however, that the tenant would forfeit any claims for
money damages by refusing to pay the rent for a substandard house.25
If the North Carolina courts interpret the phrase broadly, so that the
tenant may not withhold rent even when there has been a breach of the
implied warranty of habitability, the Act will be practically useless for most
low-income tenants in the state. Absolute prohibition of rent withholding by
the tenant would largely negate the mutuality clause in section 42-41 of the
Act and substantially lessen the tenant's leverage with the landlord. It would
transfer landlord-tenant disputes from the bargaining table to the judicial
forum by forcing the tenant to litigate in every situation in which there is an
obvious breach of the implied warranty of habitability. It is difficult to
believe that the General Assembly intended to encourage such a prolifera-
tion of litigation.
Another likely result of such a broad interpretation of this prohibition
against unilaterally withholding rent would be to foreclose the possibility of
a tenant's repairing the premises and deducting the cost from the rent. This
remedy was implicitly sanctioned by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in
pre-Act case law. 26 There is no indication elsewhere in the Act that the
General Assembly intended to limit available tenant remedies by including
this curious phrase in section 42-44(c).27
24. Id. §§ 42-41, -42.
25. The phrase "unilaterally withhold rent" is part of a subsection relating only to the
tenant's right to hold possession of the premises. It appears that the tenant's possession of the
premises is the only right that may be jeopardized by violating the prohibition against unilateral
withholding of rent. See id. § 42-44(c).
26. See Cato Ladies Modes, Inc. v. Pope, 21 N.C. App. 133, 135, 203 S.E.2d 405, 406
(1974).
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-44(c) (Supp. 1977), quoted in note 23 supra.
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On the other hand, the North Carolina courts could adopt a more
restrictive interpretation of the phrase "unilaterally withhold rent" in order
to avoid negating the doctrine of mutuality of obligations set forth in section
42-41 of the Act. Such an interpretation could reconcile the prohibition
against the unilateral withholding of rent with the mutuality of obligations
established by section 42-41 by limiting the definition of unilaterally with-
holding to a tenant's withholding of rent when there has, in fact, been no
breach of the implied warranty of habitability by the landlord. The terms
"wrongful" and "unilateral" could be read synonymously in this context
on the theory that a wrongful withholding is also unilateral because it occurs
when the landlord has not breached his mutually dependent obligation to
provide fit premises.
North Carolina courts should adopt such an interpretation because the
implied warranty of habitability created by the Act can operate effectively
only if the statutory language is reconciled in a manner that will permit
tenants to withhold rent without going to court. Such an interpretation would
also further the purpose of the implied warranty by enabling tenants to use
the threat of withholding rent in bargaining with their landlords.
28
This narrow construction of "unilaterally withhold rent" would also
allow tenants to assert a breach of implied warranty defense in summary
ejectment actions. This conclusion is supported by the fact that section 42-
44(a)29 of the Act gives the tenant the power to enforce his claim for rent
abatement ° by "civil action" and section 42-40(a)31 defines "action" to
include "defense." In a summary ejectment action for nonpayment of rent,
the tenant should not be evicted so long as he either pays the rent deemed
owing after deduction of an appropriate rent abatement32 or escrows the full
contract rent pending litigation.
In several leading jurisdictions, when a tenant raises breach of the
implied warranty of habitability as a defense for nonpayment of rent, the
finder of fact must make two determinations: (1) whether the alleged breach
existed during the period for which past due rent is claimed; and (2) what
portion of the tenant's obligation to pay rent was abated by the landlord's
breach. 33 Under this approach, if no part of the rental obligation is found to
28. See generally Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-80 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972);
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-44(a) (Supp. 1977).
30. See text accompanying notes 41-48 infra.
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-40(a) (Supp. 1977).
32. See, e.g., Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 69, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (1972).
33. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 638-39, 517 P.2d 1168, 1183-84,
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have abated, the court may issue a judgment for possession; if the trier of
fact finds that no rent is due the complaint should be dismissed; 34 but if the
trier of fact finds that the tenant is entitled to a partial abatement of rent but
that he has withheld rent in an amount greater than that abatement, no
judgment for possession should issue if the tenant agrees to pay that portion
of the rent that is found to be owing. 35 Of course, if the tenant elects not to
pay the balance due, a judgment for possession may issue.
The breach of implied warranty defense in an action for possession
based upon nonpayment of rent is to be distinguished from other defenses
already recognized by the North Carolina courts. The defense of construc-
tive eviction can be raised only when the tenant has vacated the premises as
a result of conditions rendering them seriously inadequate for his pur-
poses. 36 The illegal contract defense to a suit for the collection of rent does
not depend on whether the tenant has vacated the premises. 37 It may,
however, render the lease void and leave the occupant a tenant at will unless
the court finds that the landlord's ejectment action was retaliatory and
therefore illegal. 38 Finally, there is the well-established common law de-
fense of breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, which may be
raised by a tenant who has been partially39 or totally deprived of the use of
the premises by the landlord.' All these common law defenses are still
available to tenants. The new Act, however, may offer tenants broader
protection against eviction without as many conditions.
Ill Cal. Rptr. 704, 719-20 (1974). See generally Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 I1. 2d 351, 280
N.E.2d 208 (1972); Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972); Marini v.
Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
34. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1083 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970). In a concurring opinion in McKenna v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. App.
1977), Justice Brown expressed the opinion that a citation by the Board of Health condemning
the premises as "unfit for human habitation" showed a complete failure of consideration so
that the rental value of the premises should have been zero. Id. at 554 (Brown, J., concurring).
35. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1083 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970).
36. Thompson v. Shoemaker, 7 N.C. App. 687, 691-92, 173 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1970).
Constructive eviction can be raised by the tenant even when the landlord has failed to remedy a
defect not affirmatively caused by the landlord. See Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444,
251 A.2d 268 (1969).
37. Hines v. Norcott, 176 N.C. 123, 96 S.E. 899 (1918). See also Shephard v. Lerner, 182
Cal. App. 2d 746, 6 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1960); Todd v. May, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 731, 316 A.2d 793
(1973); Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. 1968); Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio
Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (1972).
38. See Robinson v. Diamond Housing, 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972); text accompanying
notes 74-95 infra.
39. Blomberg v. Evans, 194 N.C. 113, 138 S.E. 593 (1927).
40. See generally Carolina Helicopter Corp. v. Cutter Realty Co., 263 N.C. 139, 139
S.E.2d 362 (1964); Andrews & Knowles Produce Co. v. Currin, 243 N.C. 131, 90 S.E.2d 228
(1955); Huggins v. Waters, 154 N.C. 443, 70 S.E. 842 (1911); Poston v. Jones, 37 N.C. (2 Ired.)
350 (1842).
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Regardless of whether tenants will be allowed to assert a breach of the
implied warranty of habitability as a defense for nonpayment of rent, the Act
clearly allows an affirmative action or counterclaim for a breach of the
landlord's duties.4 The Act is silent on the measure of damages for such
breaches, however.
Leading decisions from other jurisdictions have expressed the measure
of damages for breach of the implied warranty of habitability in terms of
traditional contract remedies. 42 Thus, under the guidelines of Hadley v.
Baxendale,4 the tenant is entitled to recover damages for personal injury
and property damage, including consequential damages that were reason-
ably foreseeable at the time the contract was made.
44
North Carolina courts have long recognized the Hadley v. Baxendale
measure of damages for breach of a landlord's implied covenant to deliver
possession to the tenant 45 and the implied warranty of quiet enjoyment.
46
The courts calculate the difference between the rental value of the premises
as promised and the actual rental value of the property during the rental
term, plus any special damages alleged and proved. Special damages may
include mental as well as physical injury.47 The same measure of damages
has been applied in landlord-tenant cases involving express covenants to
repair.
48
If the North Carolina courts apply these same principles to breaches of
the implied warranty to repair, the tenant may recover the full value of the
premises as if it had been delivered in the condition warranted minus the
rental value of the premises actually provided. The value of the premises as
warranted may be more than the rent actually paid by the tenant or agreed to
be paid in the lease.49 In other words, the tenant will be entitled to damages
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-44(a) (Supp. 1977) provides: "Any right or obligation declared
by this Chapter is enforceable by civil action, in addition to other remedies of law and in
equity."
42. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1073 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976);
McKenna v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. App. 1977); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308
A.2d 17 (1973).
43. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
44. See, e.g., Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977).
45. Sloan v. Hart, 150 N.C. 269, 274, 63 S.E. 1037, 1039 (1909).
46. Andrews & Knowles Produce Co. v. Currin, 243 N.C. 131, 136, 90 S.E.2d 228, 231
(1955).
47. Burwell v. Brodie, 134 N.C. 540, 47 S.E. 47 (1904). Damages for mental distress have
also been allowed in trespass cases. See Matthews v. Forrest, 235 N.C. 281, 285, 69 S.E.2d 553,
556 (1952); May v. Western Union Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 416, 72 S.E.2d 574 (1911).
48. Brewington v. Loughran, 183 N.C. 558, 564-65, 112 S.E. 257, 259-60 (1922); Cary v.
Harris, 178 N.C. 624, 101 S.E. 486 (1919).
49. Troitino v. Goodman, 225 N.C. 406, 413, 35 S.E.2d 277,282 (1945) (allowing recovery
of difference between actual value of tractors and value if in first-class condition).
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in the form of a rent abatement calculated as the difference between the fair
rental value of the premises if the premises were in full compliance with
section 42-42(a)50 and the fair rental value of the premises in its defective
condition, plus any special damages alleged and proved.
51
In assessing the amount of damages for the diminution of the habitabili-
ty of the dwelling, the trier of fact should consider the following factors:
52
(1) violations of any applicable housing, building, or health codes; (2) the
potential or present impact of defects upon health and safety; (3) the length
of time the defect has persisted; (4) the tenant's responsibility for causing
the defect; 53 and (5) the existence of defects in the "common areas" of the
premises, outside of the individual's private living space. 54 It will be up to
the trier of fact to determine how much, in dollar terms, all of the above
factors have reduced the rental value of the premises from its value if it were
in the condition warranted by section 42-42(a) and the applicable codes.
Thus, it would be appropriate for the trier of fact first to determine what the
fair rental value of the premises would be if in the fully warranted condi-
tion.55 Then, the trier would determine the dollar value per week or month
for the reduction of usage and enjoyment that reasonably could be attributed
to the defects.
The tenant's own opinion as to the reduction in usage and enjoyment
attributable to the defects should be admissible as evidence. 56 This evidence
is comparable to allowing property owners to testify as to value of their own
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42(a) (Supp. 1977).
51, See, e.g., Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 638-39, 517 P.2d 1168, 1183, 111
Cal. Rptr. 704, 719 (1974); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 469, 308 A.2d 17, 21-22 (1973). See
generally Troitino v. Goodman, 225 N.C. 406, 35 S.E.2d 277 (1945).
52. See Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 470, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973).
53. Since § 42-41 makes the landlord's obligation to provide fit premises under § 42-42(a)
mutually dependent on the tenant's obligations under § 42-43(a)(4) and (6) to refrain from
deliberately or negligently destroying or damaging any part of the premises, the landlord may
defend against claims of the tenant by proving that the tenant or someone in the tenant's
household caused a particular defect. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-41, -42(a), -43(a)(4), (6) (Supp.
1977). Section 42-44(a) gives the landlord the right to enforce the tenant's duties in § 42-43 by
"civil action," which is defined to include "defense." Id. §§ 42-40(1), -43. -44(a).
54. Section 42-42(a)(3) requires the landlord to keep all common areas of the premises in
safe condition. Id. § 42-42(a)(3). See also McKenna v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548,553 (Mass. App.
1977); Franklin Drug Stores, Inc. v. Gur-Sil Corp., 269 N.C. 169, 152 S.E.2d 77 (1967).
55. This value might often be higher than the contract rent, especially where the landlord
knowingly delivered the premises in substandard condition. The tenant is entitled to be put in
the position he would have been in if performance had been as warranted. See Troitino v.
Goodman, 225 N.C. 406, 35 S.E.2d 277 (1945).
56. "Useful expert testimony is unlikely to be readily available as to the 'worth' of the
defects, and even if it were available, the imposition upon indigent tenants of the financial
burden of supplying expert witnesses would seriously diminish the effectiveness of the relief
contemplated in our earlier opinion." McKenna v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548, 553 (Mass. App.
1977) (citations omitted).
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real and personal property 57 and it should be given similar treatment. It is to
be expected that the proffered opinions will sometimes be imprecise, but the
nature of damages in breach of implied warranty cases, like other contract
and tort cases, is such that they cannot be computed with precision and
certainty. 58 The mere uncertainty in assessing the amount of damages should
not jeopardize the tenant's right to recover as long as these damages are the
certain result of wrongdoing on the part of the landlord. 59 The tenant should
be allowed to recover damages whenever there is proof of any violation that
is not plainly immaterial. 60
Thus, one of the tenant's most important remedies for the implied
warranty may be restitution of rent paid in excess of the fair market rental
value of the premises in its substandard condition. The application of this
remedy to breaches of the implied warranty of habitability would also
reverse the court of appeals' holding in Thompson v. Shoemaker 61 that a
tenant cannot recoup voluntary rent payments "made under a mistake of
law."
62
The General Assembly anticipated the problem of tenants making rent
payments without knowledge of their new rights and realized that such
payments might be deemed to be implicit acceptance of the substandard
conditions. To prevent such wholesale frustration of the Act, the legislature
provided specifically that the landlord would not be released of his obliga-
tions to provide fit premises by the tenant's explicit or implicit acceptance
of the landlord's defaults. 6
3
57. See, e.g., North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n v. Helderman, 285 N.C. 645, 207
S.E.2d 720 (1974) (real property); City of Elizabeth City v. Gregory, 202 N.C. 759, 762-63, 164
S.E. 354, 355 (1932) (witness allowed to express decrease in value of real property in fractional
terms); South At. Waste Co. v. Southern Ry., 167 N.C. 340, 343, 83 S.E. 618, 619 (1914)
(witness allowed to express increase or decrease in value of real property in percentage terms);
Hubbard v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 24 N.C. App. 493, 211 S.E.2d 544, cert. denied, 286
N.C. 723, 213 S.E.2d 721 (1975) (personal property).
58. See Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 638, 517 P.2d 1168, 1183, 111 Cal. Rptr.
704, 719 (1974).
59. See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555,562(1931);
Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477,485-86,268 A.2d 556,561-62 (1970); Cary
v. Harris, 178 N.C. 624, 101 S.E. 486 (1919).
60. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 n.63 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970).
61. 7 N.C. App. 687, 173 S.E.2d 627 (1970).
62. Id. at 689, 173 S.E.2d at 629.
63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42(b) (Supp. 1977) provides:
The landlord is not released of his obligations under any part of this section by the
tenant's explicit or implicit acceptance of the landlord's failure to provide premises
complying with this section, whether done before the lease was made, when it was
made, or after it was made, unless a governmental subdivision imposes an impediment
to repair for a specific period of time not to exceed six months. Notwithstanding the
provisions of this subsection, the landlord and tenant are not prohibited from making a
subsequent written contract wherein the tenant agrees to perform specified work on
the premises, provided that said contract is supported by adequate consideration other
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B. Possible Limitations on Tenants' Use of Contract Remedies
With one exception, 64 the Act does not explicitly require the tenant to
give notice to the landlord of any defects in the premises. The leading cases
from other jurisdictions have held, however, that the tenant is required to
give notice (oral or written) of defects that arise during the term of the lease,
if the landlord can be found with any reasonable effort.65 By contrast, these
jurisdictions impose no notice requirement for defects that arise before or at
the beginning of the tenancy because the landlord is presumed to know the
condition of the premises upon delivery of possession.
66
Another likely requirement that may be implicit in the Act is that the
tenant allow the landlord a reasonable time after notice to repair those
defects that arise during the term. This requirement has been implied in
jurisdictions allowing tenants the alternative remedies of repairing the de-
fects themselves and deducting the cost from the rent or suing for rent
abatement. 67
The above discussion of the measure of damages applies to the
common situation in which the tenant is unable to repair the premises
himself and is, therefore, suing for damages. In some instances, however, it
may be possible for the tenant to make relatively minor repairs. This
situation raises the question whether the tenant may deduct the reasonable
cost of such repairs from the rent,68 especially when the Act explicitly
than the letting of the premises and is not made with the purpose or effect of evading
the landlord's obligations under this Article.
This provision prohibits express waivers in the lease of tenants' rights to fit premises, such as
clauses which state that the tenant accepts the premises in an "as is" condition. The sponsors
of the legislation recognized that generally there is greatly unequal bargaining power between
landlords and residential tenants, a well-known market factor that results in widespread use of
standardized leases. See Note, Landlord and Tenant-Recent Erosions of Caveat Emptor in the
Leasing of Residential Housing, 49 N.C.L. REv. 175, 182-83 (1970). It might also violate public
policy for the lease to attempt to limit the landlord's liability. Cf. Gore v. George J. Ball, Inc.,
279 N.C. 192, 208, 182 S.E.2d 389, 398 (1971) (limitation of seller's liability in contract for sale
of seed contrary to public policy and void).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42(a)(4) (Supp. 1977), quoted in note 18 supra. The probable
reason that written notice by the tenant is required in this subdivision and not in the other three
is that this subdivision refers mainly to appliances and facilities supplied by the landlord or
required to be supplied by the landlord, whereas the previous three subdivisions refer to general
requirements of the local codes themselves, which the landlord should presumably know. Id. §
42-42(a)(l)-(3).
65. See, e.g., Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 467, 308 A.2d 17, 20 (1973).
66. See, e.g., McKenna v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548, 550 (Mass. App. 1977). The Act itself
requires the landlord to "make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the
premises in a fit and habitable condition." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42(a)(2) (Supp. 1977) (empha-
sis added). Since this duty arises at the inception of the tenancy, the landlord should presum-
ably inspect the premises and repair any defects before delivering possession to the tenant.
67. E.g., McKenna v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548, 550-52 (Mass. App. 1977).
68. This remedy has been recognized as an alternative remedy for breaches of the implied
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prohibits the tenant from "unilaterally withhold[ing] rent prior to a judicial
determination of a right to do so.' '69 Given the general rules on mitigation of
damages, 70 it would seem unreasonable to require a tenant who is willing
and able to make small repairs to bring suit to recover his costs rather than
allowing him to deduct them directly from his rent. If faced with a situation
in which the tenant has made a repair and deducted the cost from his rent,
the North Carolina courts could treat the tenant not as if he had "withheld"
his rent, but rather as if he had simply applied the rent, on the landlord's
behalf, to the cost of repairing the premises. Such a construction would
avoid the prohibition against the unilateral withholding of rent set forth in
section 42-44(c).
Although the tenant may be permitted to perform the landlord's repair
responsibilities, neither the Act, previous case law, nor the law of other
states requires the tenant to make the repairs himself and then sue for
damages. 71 One assumption behind the general rule of contract remedies
that the injured party must "cover" and then sue for the costs is that the
party injured is in a position to pay the cost of having the defects remedied.72
The crucial policy assumption, however, behind the implied warranty of
habitability is that tenants generally, and low-income tenants living in multi-
family units especially, cannot afford the cost of repairing serious defects in
their dwellings. 73 For example, requiring one tenant to spend thousands of
dollars to repair the plumbing or heating system in a multi-family apartment
building would be an inequitable, if not impossible, burden. Such a burden
would defeat the purpose of the Act, which is to place the responsibility for
basic structural maintenance on the landlord while making the tenant
warranty of habitability. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). See also Cato
Ladies Modes, Inc. v. Pope, 21 N.C. App. 133, 203 S.E.2d 405 (1974).
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-44(c) (Supp. 1977); see text accompanying notes 23-35 supra.
70. See Monger v. Lutterloh, 195 N.C. 274, 142 S.E. 12 (1928).
71. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); McKenna v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Mass. App. 1977); Berzito v.
Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 468-73, 308 A.2d 17, 21-24 (1973); Spencer v. Hamilton, 113 N.C. 49, 51,
18 S.E. 167, 168 (1893).
72. See authorities cited in McKenna v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Mass. App. 1977).
But see Thompson v. Shoemaker, 7 N.C. App. 687, 691, 173 S.E.2d 627, 630-31 (1970) (dictum)
(reciting general rule for contracts when express covenants to repair made by individual
landlord). The Act, by recognizing the implied warranty in residential leases, creates an
exception to the general rule because of the different policy assumptions underlying the
regulation of residential leases and most business contracts. For a more detailed discussion see
cases cited in note 73 infra.
73. The North Carolina Supreme Court ruled long ago that a tenant was not prevented
from recovering damages simply because he might be unable to perform the landlord's duties of
repairing the premises. Spencer v. Hamilton, 113 N.C. 49, 51, 18 S.E. 167, 168 (1893); accord,
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970); McKenna v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Mass. App. 1977); Academy Spires, Inc. v.
Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 488, 268 A.2d 556, 560 (1970).
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responsible for using the premises in a reasonable and clean manner. North
Carolina courts should therefore not require tenants to make repairs them-
selves and sue their landlords for the cost.
C. Defense Against Retaliatory Evictions
One provision that is absent from the North Carolina Act, but that has
been adopted by a majority of American jurisdictions, 74 is the tenant's
defense against retaliatory evictions. A retaliatory eviction is an action taken
by the landlord that is designed to effect the removal of a tenant, provided
the action is initiated in response to any activities on the part of the tenant
contrary to the interests of the landlord. Such activities might include
complaining to public officials or to the landlord about housing defects or
forming a tenants' association. 75 Obviously, the availability of this retalia-
tory eviction defense is important to the general efficacy of the new Act. If
tenants can be freely evicted in return for exercising their rights under
section 42-42(a), many of them may choose to live with leaky roofs and
broken windows rather than risk being left without a home altogether.
Although retaliatory evictions are not specifically addressed by the new
Act, there is no legislative history to indicate that the General Assembly
intentionally excluded a prohibition against retaliatory evictions. 76 It seems
74. Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.310 (1975); Arizona: ARiz. REV. STAT. § 33-1381 (1974);
California: CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3
Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-
20 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); Delaware: DEL. CODE tit. 25, § 5516 (1974); District of Columbia:
Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969); Florida:
FLA. DEP'T OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, RULES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, Rental Housing
and Mobile Home Parks, ch. 2-11.07 (1974); Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. § 521-74 (1976); Illinois:
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (Smith-Hurd 1966); Clore v. Fredman, 59111. 2d 20,319 N.E.2d 18
(1974); Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. § 383.705 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Maine: Mi.. REV. STAT. tit. 14,
§ 6001 (Cum. Supp. 1977-78); Maryland: MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-208.1 (Cum. Supp.
1977); Massachusetts: MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 186, § 18 (Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1977);
Michigan: MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5720 (Cum. Supp. 1978); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 566.03, .28 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1439 (1976); New
Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540.13 (1974); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 42-
10.10 (Vest Cum. Supp. 1977-78); E.& E. Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 116 N.J. Super. 220, 281
A.2d 544 (1971); New York: N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 8590, 8609 (McKinney 1974); Ohio:
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.02 (Page Supp. 1977); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 91-865 (1977);
Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Purdon 1977); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS §
34-20-10 (1969); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-5505 (1977); Virginia: VA. CODE § 55-248.39
(Cum. Supp. 1977); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 59.18.240, .250 (Cum. Supp. 1976);
Wisconsin: Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970).
75. See generally Note, The Use of the Federal Remedy to BarRetaliatory Eviction, 39 U.
CINN. L. REV. 712 (1970). The only case in North Carolina that discusses any type of retaliatory
eviction rejected, without any legal reasoning or citation of authorities, an asserted defense that
a tenant could not be evicted for exercising her constitutional rights to air other tenants'
grievances. Evans v. Rose, 12 N.C. App. 165, 182 S.E.2d 591, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 511, 183
S.E.2d 686 (1971).
76. The original draft of House Bill 949 simply failed to mention retaliatory evictions. The
chief sponsors expressed their desire to limit the size of the bill so that it would be easily
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almost inevitable that the North Carolina courts will have to decide whether
a defense to retaliatory evictions is implied by passage of the new Act,
perhaps in conjunction with three pre-existing statutes that express a public
purpose in eliminating unsafe or unsanitary dwellings."7 Hence, this article
will discuss briefly the doctrinal sources that are likely to be relevant to this
issue.
In Edwards v. Habib,78 the seminal case on retaliatory eviction, the
tenant had rented an apartment on a month-to-month basis. Shortly after
taking possession she complained to the local authorities about numerous
sanitary code violations in her unit.79 The landlord then gave the tenant a
thirty-day statutory notice to vacate the premises. By way of a defense, the
tenant alleged that the action for possession of her apartment was initiated in
retaliation for her complaints regarding the code violations.8
0
The District of Columbia court ruled that a private landlord was not
required by the District of Columbia Code for summary ejectment provi-
sions to give any reason for evicting a month-to-month tenant. That court
also expressed the view that any such limitation on the landlord's eviction
remedy would have to be based on specific statutory authority or very
special circumstances.8 1 In rejecting the lower court's opinion, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the retaliatory
eviction defense was a necessary corollary to the broad public policies
embodied in the housing code promulgated by the District of Columbia
Commissioners.
8 2
The court reviewed the legislative findings that there were blighted
housing conditions in the city that threatened the general welfare of the
inhabitants and that warranted the exercise of police powers for code
enforcement.8 3 Then in one succinct statement, the court set forth the
combination of housing factors that supported adoption of the retaliatory
eviction defense:
In light of the appalling condition and shortage of housing in Wash-
ington, the expense of moving, the inequality of bargaining power
between tenant and landlord, and the social and economic impor-
tance of assuring at least minimum standards in housing conditions,
readable by members of the public. While the bill was moving through the house and senate,
no amendments regarding retaliatory evictions were offered.
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122A-2 (Supp. 1977); id. § 160A-441 (1976), quoted in note 85 infra;
id. §§ 160A-501, -502.
78. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
79. Id. at 688.
80. Id. at 689.
81. Edwards v. Habib, 227 A.2d 388, 390, 392 (D.C. 1967); see 397 F,2d at 689-90.
82. 397 F.2d at 690, 699.
83. Id. at 700.
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we do not hesitate to declare that retaliatory eviction cannot be
tolerated. There can be no doubt that the slum dweller, even
though his home be marred by housing code violations, will pause
long before he complains of them if he fears eviction as a conse-
quence.
The notion that the effectiveness of remedial legislation will be
inhibited if those reporting violations of it can be legally in-
timidated is so fundamental that a presumption against the legality
of such intimidation can be inferred as inherent in the legislation
even if it is not expressed in the statute itself.84
The General Assembly of North Carolina has emphasized the existence
in North Carolina of several factual elements similar to those underlying the
decision in Edwards v. Habib. First, the state enabling act for the promulga-
tion of local housing codes includes the finding that dwellings that are unfit
for human habitation are inimical to the general health, safety and welfare of
the people of North Carolina.85 Second, the extensive shortage of decent,
safe and sanitary housing has also been found to be inimical to the health,
safety and welfare of all residents of the State.8 6 Third, the inequality of
bargaining power between landlords and tenants is implicitly recognized by
the provisions of the new Act. By statutorily allocating the basic duties for
repair and maintenance of habitable dwellings to landlords8 7 and by pro-
hibiting landlords from shifting these duties back to the tenants through
84. Id. at 701-02 (footnotes omitted).
85. N.C. GEN. STAr. § 160A-441 (1976) in pertinent part provides:
It is hereby found and declared that the existence and occupation of dwellings in this
State that are unfit for human habitation are inimical to the welfare and dangerous and
injurious to the health, safety and morals of the people of this State, and that a public
necessity exists for the repair, closing or demolition of such dwellings. Whenever any
city or county of this State finds that there exists in the city or county dwellings that
are unfit for human habitation due to dilapidation, defects increasing the hazards of
fire, accidents or other calamities, lack of ventilation, light or sanitary facilities, or due
to other conditions rendering the dwellings unsafe or unsanitary, or dangerous or
detrimental to the health, safety, morals or otherwise inimical to the welfare of the
residents of the city or county, power is hereby conferred upon the city or county to
exercise its police powers to repair, close or demolish the dwellings in the manner
herein provided.
The purpose of this statute is to ensure that minimum housing standards will be achieved in the
cities and counties of this state. Harrell v. City of Winston-Salem, 22 N.C. App. 386, 391, 206
S.E.2d 802, 806 (1974).
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122A-2 (Supp. 1977), which makes the legislative findings for the
establishment of the North Carolina Housing Corporation, provides in pertinent part:
The General Assembly hereby finds and declares that as a result of the spread of slum
conditions and blight to formerly sound urban and rural neighborhoods and as a result
of actions involving highways, public facilities and urban renewal activities there
exists in the State of North Carolina a serious shortage of decent, safe and sanitary
residential housing available at low prices or rentals to persons and families of lower
income. This shortage is severe in certain urban areas of the State, is especially critical
in the rural areas, and is inimical to the health, safety, welfare and prosperity of all
residents of the State and to the sound growth of North Carolina communities.
87. See id. § 42-42(a).
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adhesive leases, 88 the legislature tried to prevent landlords from having the
upper hand in drafting and enforcing rental agreements.
Regardless of whether a defense against retaliatory evictions may be
premised on the underlying policy of the foregoing housing statutes, such
improperly motivated evictions may be illegal under North Carolina General
Statutes section 75-1.1, the so-called little FTC Act.8 9 Section 75-1.1 has
been interpreted by at least one court as prohibiting retaliatory evictions. In
the unreported case of State ex rel. Carson v. Cleve9° the attorney general
filed suit on behalf of a tenant residing in a trailer park who was threatened
witheviction in retaliation for the tenant's complaining to the county health
department about a defective septic tank. The superior court91 restrained the
threatened eviction, finding it was an unfair practice affecting commerce
and therefore illegal under section 75-1.1. Subsequently, another superior
court judge 92 issued a preliminary injunction, which remained in effect until
the case was finally settled.
No claims of retaliatory eviction under section 75-1.1 have yet reached
the appellate courts of North Carolina. In the recently reported case of Love
v. Pressley,93 however, the court of appeals did hold that a landlord's
extrajudicial eviction of a tenant and subsequent conversion of the tenant's
personal property violated section 75-1.1. The court found that the land-
lord's conduct violated the ethical standards of dealing between those
engaged in business (renting property) and the consuming public and was
therefore inimical to the statute's purpose. 94 It is possible, then, that the
North Carolina courts will apply the analysis of Love v. Pressley to find that
a classic retaliatory eviction amounts to an unfair or deceptive act or practice
barred under section 75-1.1. Such a decision would parallel those reached
by courts in other jurisdictions applying laws regulating unfair trade prac-
tices to abusive acts of landlords and to unconscionable clauses in leases.
95
88: See id. § 42-42(b); note 63 and accompanying text supra.
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (Supp. 1977) provides: "(a) Unfair methods of competition
in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,
are declared unlawful. (b) For purposes of this section, 'commerce' includes all business
activities, however denominated, but does not include professional services rendered by a
member of a learned profession."
90. No. 74-CVS-852 (Carteret County, N.C. Super. Ct., Sept. 9, 1974).
91. The Honorable J. William Copeland on September 9, 1974.
92. The Honorable L. Bradford Tillery on February 19, 1975.
93. 34 N.C. App. 503, 239 S.E.2d 574 (1977).
94. Id. at 517, 239 S.E.2d at 583. Love was decided under former § 75-1.1, Law of June
12, 1969, ch. 833, § 1, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930 (current version codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75-1.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977)). The applicability of § 75-1.1 to retaliatory eviction should be
unaffected by the amendment.
95. See Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cil. 2d 463,370 P.2d 313,20 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1962);
Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1962); Common-
wealth v. DeCotis, 366 Mass. 234, 316 N.E.2d 748 (1974); Commonwealth v. Monumental
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II. NEW LANDLORD RIGHTS IN CONTRACT
Section 42-43(a) of the Residential Rental Agreements Act imposes six
obligations on tenants. 96 Subsections (4) and (6) essentially codify the
implied covenant against waste found in the common law.
97 It is possible to
read subdivision (6) to include damage beyond ordinary wear and tear that
was accidentally but not negligently caused by a tenant. Such an interpreta-
tion, however, would be inconsistent with section 42-10 which limits a
tenant's liability for waste. 98 Because section 42-10 was not repealed by the
1977 Act, it is unlikely that the legislature intended to hold tenants responsi-
ble for damage to the property that could not have been avoided by the use
of reasonable care.
99
Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812 (1974). Florida's Department of Legal Affairs,
promulgating regulations under FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 501.201-.213 (1974), listed retaliatory
eviction as an unfair or deceptive trade practice. The retaliatory conduct rule provides:
(I) It shall be an unfair or deceptive act or practice for a landlord to retaliate against
the tenant by discriminatorily increasing his rent or decreasing services, or by bringing
or threatening to bring an action for possession or other civil action because:
(a) the tenant has complained to a governmental agency charged with responsi-
bility for enforcement of a building, housing or health code of a suspected violation
applicable to the premises;
(b) the tenant has complained to the landlord of a suspected violation of the
rental agreement or of any provision of law;
(c) the tenant has complained to any governmental agency about an illegal or
unauthorized increase in rent; or
(d) the tenant has organized, encouraged or participated in a tenant organiza-tion.
(2) It shall be presumed by the enforcing authority that evidence of a complaint or
notice of violation, or evidence of any other activity protected by subsection (1),
within six months prior to the action of the landlord constitutes evidence of retaliatory
conduct by the landlord.
FLA. DEP'T OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, RULES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, Rental Housing
and Mobile Home Parks, ch. 2-11.07 (1974).
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-43(a) (Supp. 1977) requires a tenant to:
(1) Keep that part of the premises which he occupies and uses as clean and safe
as the conditions of the premises permit and cause no unsafe or unsanitary conditions
in the common areas and remainder of the premises which he uses;
(2) Dispose of all ashes, rubbish, garbage, and other waste in a clean and safe
manner;
(3) Keep all plumbing fixtures in the dwelling unit or used by the tenant as clean
as their condition permits;
(4) Not deliberately or negligently destroy, deface, damage, or remove any part
of the premises or knowingly permit any person to do so;
(5) Comply with any and all obligations imposed upon the tenant by current
applicable building and housing codes; and
(6) Be responsible for all damage, defacement, or removal of any property
inside a dwelling unit in his exclusive control unless said damage, defacement or
removal was due to ordinary wear and tear, acts of the landlord or his agent, defective
products supplied or repairs authorized by the landlord, acts of third parties not
invitees of the tenant, or natural forces.
97. See, e.g., Winkler v. Appalachian Amusement Co., 238 N.C. 589, 79 S.E.2d 185
(1953).
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-10 (1976) provides: "A tenant for life, or years, or for a less
term, shall not be liable for damage occurring on the demised premises accidentally, and
notwithstanding reasonable diligence on his part, unless he so contract."
99. It is generally presumed that when passing new legislation the General Assembly is
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The tenant's obligations under subdivisions (1), (2), (3) and (5) are
new requirements of state law. The most general duty, found in subdivision
(1), is to keep the part of the premises that the tenant occupies and uses as
clean and safe as the conditions of the premises permit. Of course, this
obligation must be read in conjunction with the landlord's mutually depen-
dent obligation t°° under section 42-42(a) to provide fit premises. By way of
illustration, subdivision (1) of section 42-43(a) generally would require the
tenant to keep the woodwork and frames of windows as clean as their
condition permits, but the tenant's failure to clean the window frames might
be excused if the wood were so rotten that scrubbing it might cause the
window panes to fall out.101 Mutuality can also work in favor of the
landlord. Thus, a tenant's failure to maintain part of the premises as required
by section 42-43 could release the landlord from his duty to repair that part
under section 42-42. For example, if the tenant breaks a window, the
landlord will not be required to repair it, even though that repair may be
necessary to put the premises in habitable condition. Similarly, the landlord
could plead the tenant's breach of one of his obligations as a defense in a suit
for breach of a related section 42-42 obligation.
Aside from the effect of the mutuality provision, the landlord's reme-
dies for the tenant's breach of the duties imposed under section 42-43(a) are
essentially those provided by contract law and the common law of waste. 102
Though the landlord probably will be concerned about damages and un-
cleanliness at the end of the term,103 the Act does not require him to wait
until the end of the term to enforce the tenant's obligations. In order to
enforce the tenant's duties under section 42-43(a), however, the landlord
must give the tenant written notice of any alleged breaches, "except in
emergency situations.'"0° Presumably, the tenant must also be given a
reasonable time after receipt of the notice to cure the breach before the
landlord's right to sue accrues. 05
aware of existing law and does not intend to repeal statutes without so stating. Spaugh v. City of
Charlotte, 239 N.C. 149, 79 S.E.2d 748 (1954).
100. See discussion of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42(a) (Supp. 1977) in text accompanying notes
21-23 supra.
101. The landlord would be responsible for replacing rotten wood under most local housing
codes and, therefore, under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42(a)(1) (Supp. 1977).
102. See id. § 42-44(a).
103. Since most cleaning and repair charges are small, the landlord generally expects to
deduct these costs from the tenant's security deposit. See the new regulation of security
deposits in Article 6 of Chapter 42 of the General Statutes. Id. §§ 42-50 to -56.
104. Id. § 42-43(b).
105. This is inferred from the analogous requirement that the tenant notify the landlord of
defects in the premises that arise during the term, id. § 42-42(4), and allow a reasonable time for
curing. Normally, oral notice suffices for both landlords and tenants.
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The Act, of its own force, does not provide any new remedies that
would allow the landlord to have the tenant evicted. Unless the lease
specifically provides that the tenant forfeits the term for a particular act or
omission, the landlord may not evict the tenant for failing to perform his
duties under section 42-43(a).106
III. NEW LIABILITY IN TORT FOR THE LANDLORD
Historically, North Carolina courts have retained the common law rules
imposing limited liability in tort on the landlord. For example, the landlord
is liable to third parties (nontenants) for injury resulting from the disrepair of
the premises only if the condition existed at the time the premises were
leased and the landlord failed to make the necessary repairs within a
reasonable time.
107
Generally, liability of the landlord for injury to the tenant or the
tenant's guests caused by defective conditions on the premises has been
governed by the doctrine of caveat emptor. 08 A few exceptions to this rule
have been recognized, however. When the landlord retains control over a
portion of the premises, he may be held liable for ordinary negligence that
causes injury to the tenant's property.1°9 In addition, once the landlord
agrees to repair the premises, he may be held liable for personal injury to the
tenant resulting from negligent performance of the repair work. 110 Other-
wise, the landlord is liable to the tenant for injuries resulting from defective
conditions only if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the defects are
latent; (2) the landlord had actual or constructive knowledge of such danger-
ous conditions and failed to warn the tenant; and (3) the tenant was not
aware of the danger and could not have discovered it through the exercise of
ordinary care.'11
The passage of the Residential Rental Agreements Act has created a
new standard of care owed by the landlord to his tenant in North Carolina.
Although the Act's only explicit reference to tort liability states that
106. See Morris v. Austraw, 269 N.C. 218, 152 S.E.2d 155 (1967) (stating general rule that
tenant will not be deemed to have forfeited term for any breach of lease unless lease specifically
reserves right of landlord to declare forfeiture for particular breach by tenant).
107. Childress v. Lawrence, 220 N.C. 195, 16 S.E.2d 842 (1941); Knight v. Foster, 163 N.C.
329, 79 S.E. 614 (1913). But see Andrews v. Taylor, 34 N.C. App. 706, 239 S.E.2d 630 (1977)
(dictum).
108. See cases cited in notes 5 & 6 supra.
109. Rucker & Sheely Co. v. Willey, 174 N.C. 42, 93 S.E. 379 (1917). The landlord is also
liable for purposeful refusal to repair conditions under his control. See Steffan v. Meiselman,
223 N.C. 154, 25 S.E.2d 626 (1943).
110. See, e.g., Livingston v. Essex Inv. Co., 219 N.C. 416, 14 S.E.2d 489 (1941).
111. Robinson v. Thomas, 244 N.C. 732, 94 S.E.2d 911 (1956). The same rule applies to
social guests of the tenant. See Clarke v. Kerchner, 11 N.C. App. 454, 181 S.E.2d 787 (1971).
But see Andrews v. Taylor, 34 N.C. App. 706, 239 S.E.2d 630 (1977).
19781
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
violations of the Act do not constitute negligence per se, 1 2 this reference
itself implies that the landlord is now liable for ordinary negligence by
failing to deliver and maintain fit premises. Since the previous rule shielding
the landlord from liability for negligence was premised upon the lack of any
implied duty to provide fit premises,"13 it is logical that ordinary liability
should attach to the duties imposed under the new Act.
Although the Act has created a new standard of care for landlords, it is
possible the North Carolina courts still will not find landlords liable for
personal injuries caused by negligent failure to comply with the statutory
obligations in section 42-42(a). The courts would at least have to reconcile
any such new liability with the old rationale for denying liability even when
the landlord expressly covenanted to make the repairs."I4 This rationale was
grounded on the presumed requirement that the tenant could and, indeed,
had to repair the defects in the premises for the landlord. As previously
discussed, the implied warranty of habitability has been construed in other
jurisdictions in such a manner that the tenant is no longer required to
perform the work for the defaulting landlord, 1is and there is at least one
North Carolina case indicating that tenants who are without the financial
means to cover for the landlord are not foreclosed from recovering damages
in contract.16 Thus, the basis of the old rationale for denying liability for
negligence may have been removed by the statutory recognition of an
implied warranty of habitability.
There are well-reasoned opinions from other jurisdictions that would
support the adoption of such an approach by the courts of North Carolina. In
Sargent v. Ross 1 7 and Old Town Development Co. v. Langford,118 the
courts interpreted the implied warranty of habitability to mean that the
landlord must exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of the premises
for purposes of tort liability, as well as contract liability. Having recognized
a new standard of care for the landlord, the courts saw no reason to deny
112. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-44(d) (Supp. 1977).
113. Fields v. Ogburn, 178 N.C. 407, 100 S.E. 583 (1919).
114. A contract to repair does not contemplate as damages for the failure to perform it
that any liability for personal injuries shall grow out of the defective condition of the
premises; because the duty of the tenant, if the landlord fails to perform his contract to
repair, is to do the work himself, and recover the cost in an action for that purpose, or
upon a counterclaim in an action for rent, or if the premises are made untenable by
reason of the breach of contract, the tenant may move out and defend in an action for
rent as upon an eviction. In accordance with this view, in order to recover damages
for personal injuries there must be shown some clear act of negligence or misfeasance
on the part of the landlord beyond the mere breach of covenant.
Jordan v. Miller, 179 N.C. 73, 75, 101 S.E. 550, 551-52 (1919).
115. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
116. Spencer v. Hamilton, 113 N.C. 49, 18 S.E. 167 (1893).
117. 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
118. 349 N.E.2d 744, 762-65 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
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compensation for personal injury when property damage caused by the same
defect was compensated.
In those jurisdictions in which ordinances or statutes require landlords
to provide and maintain fit premises but do not expressly provide for
liability in tort or contract, some courts have found tort liability to be the
logical consequence of such protective legislation. 119 The rationale for
liability was articulated in Altz v. Leiberson,120 a landmark case in which
the New York Court of Appeals inferred tort liability from the passage of
New York's Tenement House Law. The statute generally required rental
units to be kept in good repair, but it did not address the issue of tort liability
.directly. The statute did not indicate which party had the duty to make the
repairs. Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the legislature "must have
known that unless repairs in the rooms of the poor were made by the
landlord, they would not be made by anyone. The duty imposed became
commensurate with the need.'
121
The North Carolina General Assembly's intent to place the obligation
to provide and maintain fit premises on landlords is clear from the Act. 122 It
is equally clear that the legislature intended that tenants be able to recover
civil damages for the landlord's breach of these new duties. 123 At the very
least, the legislature must have intended these duties to carry contractual
liability. Since in North Carolina liability in tort is recognized for negligent
performance of contractual duties, 124 the legislature must have intended that
the new standards of care create concomitant liability in tort. If the legisla-
ture had not realized the tort dimensions of the new standards of care, there
would have been no reason to exclude findings of negligence per se under
section 42-44(d).125
Thus, the net effect of the new standard of care for providing and
maintaining fit premises may be to allow violations of the Act to be used as
119. See Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 218 P.2d 17 (1950); McNally v.
Ward, 192 Cal. App. 2d 871, 14 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1961); Annis v. Britton, 232 Mich. 291,205 N.W.
128 (1925); Saracino v. Capital Properties Assocs., Inc., 50 N.J. Super. 81, 141 A.2d 71 (1958);
Altz v. Leiberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922).
120. 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922).
121. Id. at 19, 134 N.E. at 704 (construing Law of March 20, 1909, ch. 99, 1909 N.Y. Laws
155 (repealed 1952) (current version of landlord's duty to repair codified at N.Y. MULT. DWELL.
LAW § 78 (McKinney 1974))).
122. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42 (Supp. 1977).
123. See id. § 42-44(a).
124. See Sims v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 27 N.C. App. 25, 217 S.E.2d 737, cert.
denied, 288 N.C. 511, 219 S.E.2d 347 (1975).
125. The bill's chief sponsor in the house, Rep. Henry Frye (D. Guilford), agreed to the
amendment which became § 42-44(d) because certain critics of the bill expressed their belief, in
floor debate, that violations of § 42-42(a) causing personal injury to the tenant would result in
strict liability in tort.
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evidence of ordinary negligence.' 26 If the North Carolina courts adopt this
view, the landlord's liability for negligence would be contingent upon the
tenant's ability to produce evidence of a violation of the Act, proximate
cause, and the landlord's actual or constructive knowledge of the viola-
tion.127 In other words, the ordinary rules of negligence would apply.
CONCLUSION
Passage of the new Act portends a major shift in landlord-tenant
relations for a state that has labored under the common law for nearly 200
years. It is the first piece of consumer-oriented real property legislation ever
passed by the General Assembly. Although the standards of care are ex-
pressed in broad terms and the remedies are confusing, the courts of North
Carolina have ample case law from other jurisdictions, as well as their own
heritage of contract law, to assist them in interpreting the Act.
The courts should view the Act as remedial legislation and construe the
difficult sections in a manner that will facilitate the purpose of protecting
housing consumers. In particular, the courts should recognize an equitable
defense to retaliatory evictions. If the courts are unable to unravel the
ambiguities and apparent contradictions in a manner favorable to the
consumer, it will be incumbent on the General Assembly to clarify its intent.
Realistically, the interplay of the judiciary and the legislature in this field
may require several years before clear rules emerge. Both consumers and
suppliers of rental housing should hope that this process will begin soon.
126. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.6, at 997 (1956); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 201 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS
§ 288B(2) (1965).
127. See Hancock v. Abbitt Realty Co., 142 Ga. App. 739, 236 S.E.2d 860 (1977) (for
landlord to have constructive knowledge of defect, tenant need only show that it existed for
such length of time or under such circumstances as would put owner of building on notice).
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